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3 Humanitarian solutions to improve dignity and wellbeing for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh
There are almost 1 million Rohingya refugees currently living in Cox’s Bazar, 
Bangladesh. The vast majority of these people are confined to government-
run camps—they live in deplorable conditions, are unable to legally work or 
leave the camps, and are entirely supported by international aid. The Rohingya 
suffer from a distinct lack of access to durable solutions, in that safe return to 
Myanmar is not possible and the prospects of local integration or resettlement 
to a third country are extremely limited. While ending refugee crises invariably 
requires long-term political solutions, this article will argue that where repeated 
efforts to pressure Myanmar to address its human rights abuses and create the 
conditions for safe and voluntary repatriation have proven ineffective, more 
attention should be paid to shorter-term humanitarian solutions. Potential 
interim strategies designed to increase self-sufficiency, dignity and wellbeing 
will be assessed with a view to developing a holistic strategy that can provide 
short- and medium-term support, while a longer-term political solution to 
what is one of world’s most severe humanitarian crises is sought.
ABSTRACT
4 Humanitarian solutions to improve dignity and wellbeing for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh
Chiu & Chan 2017). The dire situation is compounded by 
the fact that the Rohingya cannot leave the camps (at 
the time of writing, the Bangladesh Army was erecting 
a fence around the perimeter of all camps), nor do they 
have access to information via the internet due to a 
government ban. 
Despite the urgency of the situation, access to any 
of the three internationally recognised durable 
solutions—voluntary repatriation, local integration and 
resettlement—is years away, at best. ‘Durable solutions’ 
are solutions that enable refugees to secure the political, 
legal and social conditions necessary to maintain life, 
livelihood and dignity (Danish Refugee Council 2020). 
While clearly the preferred option of Bangladesh and 
indeed the international community, as evidenced by the 
two repatriation agreements signed between Bangladesh 
and Myanmar since 2017, safe repatriation to Myanmar is 
simply not possible. The Myanmar government has failed 
to improve the living conditions of the 120,000 Rohingya 
who have remained confined to Internally Displaced 
People (IDP) camps in Rakhine State since 2012 (Beyrer 
& Kamarulzaman 2017), much less address the lack of 
legal status of the Rohingya by granting citizenship and 
ensuring equal rights to the other peoples of Myanmar 
(Kipgen 2019). Only a fundamental shift in law and 
policy by the Myanmar government and the Tatmadaw 
could bring about the conditions for return and stop 
the repeated forced displacement that has defined the 
Rohingya’s existence since the 1970s (Brinham 2017 
and Tran 1996). The challenge, therefore, is how to 
address the disconnect between the need for structural 
solutions, which may be years, even decades, away, and 
the limitations of humanitarian assistance, which can 
only provide the bare minimum of support.
Local integration of nearly 1 million Rohingya is a highly 
unlikely option in a country where 25% of the population 
lives below the poverty line (Asian Development Bank 
2016), a stance made very clear by government at all 
levels in Bangladesh. In an already unstable political 
environment, the potential range of challenges that local 
integration would pose to the local economy, political 
system, environment and society in general (Al Imran 
& Mian 2014; Alam 2018, Brinham 2017; and Tran 1996) 
presents too great a risk for the Bangladesh government 
to entertain. Additionally, continued encampment allows 
the government to show its ‘humanitarian’ side (by 
permitting refuge in Bangladesh) while playing to people’s 
sense of nationalism (by limiting such refuge to camps in 
order to protect Bangladeshi citizens’ interests). Finally, 
the third durable solution, resettlement, is afforded 
much less attention because it is both legally impossible 
and contrary to the prevailing populist sentiment seen 
in many parts of the world (Juan-Torres 2017). While 
the Bangladesh government refuses to recognise the 
Rohingya as refugees and support their resettlement to 
avoid creating a ‘pull-factor’ from Myanmar (Bhatia et al 
2018 and Rashid 2019), the reality is that, given the insular 
policies of the United States, Europe and other influential 
countries, resettlement of such a large caseload would 
likely take decades were it even possible (Rashid 2019).  
Introduction
The Rohingya have been f leeing persecution by the 
Myanmar government and military, otherwise known 
as the Tatmadaw, for decades. In what has become a 
desperate situation, these people are currently confined 
to encampment with no realistic prospects of voluntary 
repatriation, integration or resettlement. Efforts on 
the part of the international community dating back 
as far as the 1980s to pressure Myanmar to address 
its lamentable human rights record have failed time 
and time again, and human rights abuses persist today 
despite political change and the arrival of so-called 
democratic government in 2015. After briefly outlining 
the Rohingya’s lack of access to durable solutions and 
highlighting the limited prospects of Myanmar accepting 
their return while respecting their human rights in the 
near future, this paper will analyse strategies proposed 
and/or implemented in three other camp settings 
(Thailand, Ethiopia and Uganda) before presenting 
a tailored solution for the Rohingya context. The 
solution will involve a range of short- and medium-term 
initiatives designed to increase self-reliance through 
livelihood opportunities, access to land and the easing of 
restrictions on work and movement. Such interventions 
are critical to the survival of the Rohingya where longer-
term political discussions have essentially stalled. 
Mass exoduses from Rakhine State in Myanmar across 
the border to neighbouring Bangladesh occurred in 1978, 
1991–1992, 1996–1997, 2012 and, most recently, 2017–2018. 
While each exodus has been significant in number, the 
one commencing in August 2017 was by far the greatest; 
almost 720,000 stateless Rohingya women, men and 
children fled highly organised attacks by the Tatmadaw 
involving beatings, rape and murder, in what has been 
described as “a textbook example of ethnic cleaning” (Al 
Hussein in Beyrer & Kamarulzaman 2017, p. 1571). There 
are 32 camps in Cox’s Bazar in which some 930,000 
Rohingya reside. Two camps were formed following the 
1991–1992 influx, now home to around 50,000 people, 
while the remaining camps were formed following the 
2017–2018 influx. The fact that camps dating back almost 
30 years are still in existence today indicates the likely 
future of those recently formed. 
According to Bangladesh law, the Rohingya are not 
allowed to leave their specific camp or engage in 
work, with the exception of ‘cash-based interventions’ 
through which humanitarian agencies are permitted 
to employ Rohingya on an hourly basis to perform 
manual tasks inside the camps. Other than this cash-
for-work program, the Rohingya are entirely dependent 
on humanitarian assistance to address the most basic 
needs, such as food, water, shelter and health services. 
These provisions aim to save lives, reduce suffering and 
maintain dignity, and are provided by a range of United 
Nations and non-government organisations funded by 
national governments from around the world. There is 
ample coverage of the deplorable conditions in which 
the Rohingya live within the camps—of particular note 
are alarming health conditions (Ahmed et al 2018); poor 
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) standards (Hsan 
et al 2019) and limited education (Prodip 2017, and Chan, 
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This precarious situation begs the question of where 
to go from here in terms of advancing the Rohingya’s 
prospects of achieving a durable solution. Various 
options are presented in the existing literature, which 
can be broken down into two categories: general 
strategies applicable to any refugee context; and those 
relating specifically to the Rohingya in Bangladesh. As 
this paper will show, however, these strategies have 
proved thoroughly ineffective to date due to Myanmar’s 
resolute disregard for the rights of the Rohingya. Rather 
than persisting with ineffective policies, it is submitted 
that short-term solutions designed to increase refugees’ 
self-reliance must be assessed with a view to establishing 
strategies that will improve the Rohingya’s wellbeing, as 
long-term solutions remain out of reach. In line with 
UNHCR’s guidance that “enabling refugees to become 
self-reliant pending the realization of an appropriate 
long-term solution is an important first step towards 
achieving any of the three durable solutions” (UNHCR 
2011, p. 186), this paper will assess the applicability of 
interventions used in other contexts in the Rohingya 
camps and conclude with a tailored-solution for the 
Rohingya context considering both long- and short-
term solutions. 
Strategies presented in the existing literature
Non-context specific strategies
There is considerable discussion around the role of 
the international community in bringing about the 
conditions to create durable solutions in general, 
without applicability to any specific refugee crisis. 
Various authors have analysed refugee crises across 
the globe and produced recommendations designed to 
tackle the issues. As will be shown, their applicability to 
the Rohingya crises and, therefore, their effectiveness, is 
highly questionable. 
Cristiani (2015), Morgan (2002) and Loescher & Milner 
(2003) all strongly advocate for the need for external 
assistance in one form or another. Cristiani focuses 
on the need for international involvement in the form 
of international relations and foreign policy to resolve 
refugee crises, while Morgan looks more specifically 
at external assistance through peace enforcement and 
nation-building. Loescher & Milner note the importance 
of states actively engaging in capacity-building in the 
countries from which refugees flee and reconsidering 
how the external elements of their policies may be 
utilised to respond to crises in a more comprehensive 
fashion. More specifically, they assert the importance 
of the European Union (EU) and its member states and 
other countries making concerted efforts to directly 
address the human rights abuses that cause refugees to 
flee and seek refuge in the first place. While strategies 
such as these no doubt have merit as general approaches, 
without more specific, contextualised details, the failure 
of these very forms of external assistance to have any 
impact on the policies of the Myanmar government to 
date (described in more detail below) casts serious doubt 
on their applicability to the Rohingya crisis. 
Solutions specific to the Rohingya context
A significant body of academic literature is dedicated to 
solutions specific to the Rohingya crisis. These solutions 
can broadly be categorised as follows: 
1. International pressure on Myanmar to change their 
policies towards the Rohingya.
2. Increased burden-sharing on the part of third 
countries in terms of resettlement and financial 
support to Bangladesh.  
3. Increased self-reliance on the part of the Rohingya to 
better equip them for what will most likely be their 
new life in Bangladesh.  
As in the case of the more general solutions outlined 
above, it is evident that the first two lack applicability 
on the current political environment. The third solution, 
however, has promise but requires much deeper 
examination.
Collective pressure, whether through treaties, joint 
action or otherwise, to pressure Myanmar into resolving 
the Rohingya issue are widely proposed. Al Imran & Mian 
(2014) argue that Bangladesh should enter into bilateral 
or multilateral treaties to garner the support needed to 
resolve the crisis, as well as engage the international 
community in general to pressure Myanmar to take the 
lead in resolving the problem, while Brinham (2017) talks 
of a “joined-up effort to secure durable solutions”. Suaedy 
& Hafiz (2015) take a different approach in examining the 
decades-long struggle of the Rohingya to gain citizenship 
in Myanmar, noting that “stronger international and 
ASEAN involvement is needed to change the Myanmar 
government policy of discrimination against minorities, 
particularly the Rohingya” (p. 57). The fundamental flaw 
in this collective pressure approach, however, is the fact 
that the international community, led predominantly by 
the United States (US) and the EU—itself a collection of 
sovereign countries—have been attempting to pressure 
the Myanmar government to address their deplorable 
human rights policies for decades. The continued 
persecution of the Rohingya, among other minority 
groups, in the face of these efforts is strong evidence 
that these policies have failed.  
Ever since the violent suppression and killing of 
thousands of citizens who demonstrated against 
the ruling government in 1988, the US has taken 
a raft of measures to pressure the government of 
Myanmar (previously Burma) to stop the violation of 
internationally recognised human rights. Ewing Chow 
(2007) provides a detailed account of these measures, 
some of which include revoking Myanmar’s benefits 
under the Generalized System of Preferences; non-
renewal of bilateral textile agreements; prohibiting any 
new assistance to Myanmar, including prohibiting US 
citizens both in the US and in Myanmar from making 
new investments in Myanmar; and barring any expansion 
of existing trade commitments. In 2003, the US banned 
the importation of any goods produced in Myanmar, 
froze assets in the US held by government officials and 
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banned visas to the US for the same individuals, and 
committed to blocking any application by Myanmar for 
loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank. In addition, the US State Department has 
released reports accusing the Myanmar government 
of serious human rights abuses. Meanwhile, measures 
taken by the EU since 1996 involve suspending all 
defence cooperation and non-humanitarian bilateral 
aid, and extending and strengthening existing sanctions 
such as an arms embargo, visa bans, the revocation of 
benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences, 
asset freezes and bans on the export of equipment to 
Myanmar. While some of these sanctions were lifted 
following the transition of power to the National League 
for Democracy (NLD) in 2015, a range of sanctions 
nonetheless continue today. Finally, examples of 
multilateral pressure include multiple UN-led enquiries 
into human rights abuses and a resolution by the 
International Labour Organization ending technical 
cooperation with Myanmar and barring Myanmar from 
meetings.
The Myanmar government’s ongoing gross mistreatment 
of the Rohingya and other minority groups since the 
sanctions, resolutions and other collective efforts 
since 1988 shows their futility. Military offensives and 
violence by law enforcement against the Rohingya 
have seen repeated mass exodus from Rakhine State 
to Bangladesh, including 250,000 people in 1992–1992, 
10,000 in 1996 and 7000 in 1997. The movements were 
so great that in 2012 Bangladesh closed the border to 
thousands of fleeing Rohingya, though in August 2017 
it had no choice to reopen them when some 700,000 
people stormed the border to escape what has since 
been called a genocide. This is in addition to the 600,000 
Rohingya that remain in Rakhine State, 120,000 of whom 
are restricted to squalid IDP camps under the control 
of the Myanmar Army and surviving only on aid. Sadly, 
the Rohingya are not the only persecuted minority from 
Myanmar. There remain almost 100,000 predominantly 
Karen and Karenni refugees in camps located along the 
Thai–Myanmar border who fled government offensives 
in the eastern states of Myanmar over the past three 
decades. With refugees lining its borders to both the east 
and west, the blatant ineffectiveness of the collective 
international pressure on Myanmar to change its ways is 
palpable, casting great doubt over suggestions to do the 
same in the current context when Myanmar’s position 
has not changed. While this clearly does not mean that 
the use of collective pressure should be abandoned 
entirely, it does show that the likelihood of producing 
any significant results in the short term is minimal, and 
that other strategies must be given more attention. 
Increased burden-sharing on the part of third 
countries is a critical part of any refugee response, as 
recently recognised through the Global Compact on 
Refugees (UNHCR 1996). Rashid (2019), Gorlick (2019) 
and Beyer & Kamarulzaman (2017) all highlight the 
importance of third countries supporting Bangladesh 
through humanitarian assistance and/or resettlement. 
Nevertheless, in judging what impact they might have, 
one must look closer at the current situation when 
it comes to the two key aspects of burden-sharing: 
resettlement to third countries and financial support 
to Bangladesh. As a matter of policy, resettlement to 
third countries is currently restricted by the Bangladesh 
government in an attempt to avoid the creation of a ‘pull 
factor’, which would encourage the remaining 600,000 
Rohingya located across the border in Rakhine State to 
cross the border in the hope of resettlement (UNHCR 
in Rashid 2019). Further, even if Bangladesh did allow 
resettlement to take place, the number of refugees 
accepted would be insignificant compared to the 
Rohingya population in Bangladesh, given the current 
resettlement policies of the main recipient countries 
(the US, Canada and Australia). As Rashid (p. 9) notes, “In 
the wake of the influence of right-wing political forces 
in Europe and Australia and the retreat of the US—a 
traditional refugee resettlement state—from admitting 
migrants and refugees, third-country resettlement of 
Rohingyas has a bleak future.” With respect to financial 
contributions to Bangladesh as the host country, as with 
any protracted refugee situation (despite being less than 
three years since the most recent influx), donor fatigue 
has already set in, with total funding falling significantly 
from US$827 million in 2019 to just US$198 million during 
the first five months of 2020 (UNOCHA 2020). The 
politics of aid can be cruel and the Rohingya crisis has 
all but disappeared from the media, giving way to crises 
in the Middle East, such as in Syria and Yemen, which 
have a direct impact on key states such as the US and 
Europe. Like collective pressure, it is argued that when 
burden-sharing is viewed in the context of the current 
political environment its applicability and effectiveness 
are called into question. 
The third solution, increasing the self-reliance of the 
Rohingya, is a far more practical solution. Under the 
current context, it can be applied with a reasonable 
chance of successfully bringing about results in 
improving the wellbeing of the Rohingya. Self-reliance 
refers to “developing and strengthening livelihoods of 
persons of concern, and reducing their vulnerability 
and long-term reliance on humanitarian/external 
assistance” (UNHCR 2005, p. 1). Though criticised by 
Easton-Calabria & Omata (2018) as driven by donors 
looking for low-cost strategies to withdraw support 
from protracted refugee crises, self-reliance has wide 
support. Bhatia (2018), Gorlick (2019) and Rashid (2019) 
all make mention of the need for greater support for 
the Rohingya while they remain in Bangladesh: Bhatia 
and Gorlick both note the importance of short-term 
measures designed to increase access to work and 
education, while Rashid mentions the importance of 
enhancing capacities and reducing refugees’ reliance 
on aid (though without offering any detailed analysis). 
While without doubt the most productive of the 
three approaches, nowhere in the existing literature 
is this explored in depth, with reference to specific 
strategies that may guide the policies and programs of 
governments, the UN and aid agencies. It is argued that 
it is the most appropriate strategy in a context where 
the alternative is perpetual dependency on aid with 
no access to durable solutions; further examination is 
required into this critical area.
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Strategies adopted in other refugee contexts
Thailand
Decades of military offensives against the minority 
ethnic groups of southeastern Myanmar have seen 
over 150,000 people take refuge across the border in 
Thailand. While the most intense fighting took place 
during between 1980 and 2005, and despite the fact that 
Myanmar has seen political changes and the beginning 
of quasi-civilian rule since 2011, almost 100,000 
refugees remain on the Thai side of the border. This 
case study is of particular relevance as not only does 
it involve the same source country, government and 
military (Myanmar), but refugees in both Thailand and 
Bangladesh suffer from the same heavy government-
imposed restrictions to movement outside the camps 
and obtaining legal work. 
Maynard & Suter (2009) provide a detailed overview of 
the main strategies used to enhance self-reliance in the 
Thai camps, involving support to produce handicrafts, 
deliver income-generation training, facilitate access 
to markets, and provide human rights education. Due 
to government restrictions, the handicrafts produced, 
which include traditional clothing, blankets and wall 
hangings, were previously only sold within the camps; 
however, following advocacy by NGOs to the Royal Thai 
Government, the products are now sold outside the 
camps. This increased access to markets represents 
a significant advancement in the ability of the camp 
residents to become self-reliant.
Specif ic aspects of income-generation training 
include increasing profitability, accessing markets and 
developing marketing strategies. Alongside income-
generation training, other livelihood strategies include 
vocational and micro-enterprise training, funding for 
micro-enterprise equipment, resources and repair 
management, self-managed savings schemes, and 
collaboration with local villagers in product development 
and marketing channels (Maynard & Suter, ibid). Notably, 
Maynard & Suter (p. 145) argue that providing human 
rights training on key issues, such as the right to work 
and fair pay, also proved effective “in building social 
capital and networks to circumvent barriers and build 
capacity to achieve social and economic self-reliance”.
Given the fact that the refugees in Thailand and 
Bangladesh suffer from the same restrictions on work 
and movement, these strategies are highly relevant to 
the Cox’s Bazar context. The provision of materials, tools 
and machines as required to support the production of 
handicrafts for sale within the camps would provide 
an important source of income for those with the 
relevant skills, while training could also be provided 
to others in parallel to ensure equal opportunities for 
all. In particular, the production of clothing, paintings, 
decorations and wall hangings would be of use given 
the existing skills of Rohingya women and girls, who 
particularly suffer from a lack of access to livelihood 
opportunities due to cultural norms that do not allow 
them to leave their homes during the day. Income-
generation training, including how to maximize earnings 
power, would also be very useful as Rohingya have very 
limited access to markets, though the low literacy 
rate would need to be taken into consideration when 
designing the program. An excellent livelihood would 
be repairs to basic items such as solar lights, which are 
provided to all households by humanitarian agencies 
yet frequently break. Finally, the application of a rights-
based approach, as employed in the Thai camps, through 
which knowledge and practices around human rights can 
be taught, is of the utmost importance for the Rohingya. 
Considering their status as stateless refugees and given 
the fact that the concept of human rights has been 
denied to them from birth, education on relevant human 
rights frameworks, including international human rights 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights—and, more specifically, their relevance to the 
Rohingya—would be of huge benefit in forming a basis 
for advocacy for improved conditions, either directly 
or through other stakeholders, as well as promoting 
solidarity among the refugee community. Note, however, 
that this would need to be done in a context-specific 
way: for the Rohingya, who have arguably enjoyed none 
of the basic human rights during their lifetime, it may be 
difficult to understand the relevance of these rights or 
how they can be of service to them as people who are 
more concerned with survival. 
Ethiopia
The arrival of Eritrean refugees to Ethiopia commenced 
during the Ethiopian–Eritrean War (1998–2000) and has 
continued since, largely due to the Eritrean government 
policy of military conscription. In 2019, 70,129 new 
asylum seekers from Eritrea sought refuge in Ethiopia, 
and, by the end of 2019, the registered population in the 
Tigray and Afar area stood at 139,281 persons (UNHCR 
2019). The vast majority of these people live in camps 
dependent on aid, while a very small number have 
benefited from an ‘out-of-camp scheme’ through which 
Eritreans are permitted to live outside the camps if they 
are able to support themselves. As previously mentioned, 
the Rohingya are not permitted to leave the camps in 
Cox’s Bazar at this stage, therefore, the latter option is 
not analysed in this paper.  
Like the Rohingya and the Myanmar refugees in Thailand, 
encampment with very limited access to durable 
solutions has led to a very low level of self-reliance in 
the camps and livelihood interventions are the most 
appropriate response (Samuel Hall Consulting 2014). Key 
initiatives outlined by Samuel Hall Consulting (ibid) that 
are designed to increase access to livelihoods include 
nine-month-long vocational training in electronics and 
electricity, metal work, construction, food preparation, 
furniture making and tailoring/garment making. While 
this has increased knowledge of necessary vocational 
skills, life skills, literacy and numeracy among the 
refugees, Samuel Hall Consulting notes that three 
months after completing the training, the number 
of graduates with jobs was not as high as had been 
expected. Samuel Hall Consulting recommends a follow-
up program including an apprenticeship, local and 
regional trade fairs, innovative credit mechanisms and 
self-help groups to support micro-entrepreneurship. 
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As discussed above, vocational training is an excellent 
strategy that would allow the Rohingya to learn skills 
that could be applied to generate income and develop 
self-reliance. However, critical to the success of such a 
program is a demand for the skills taught, which may 
not be present in the camps at Cox’s Bazar. Household 
and community shelters are not connected to mains 
electricity and most households only have one portable 
solar light with no household solar lighting system. This 
means that almost no households have the power to 
run anything more than a simple radio, mobile phone 
or torch/lamp, therefore, training in electronics and 
electricity should be limited to information specific to 
these devices. Construction training is certainly useful, 
as in a camp with 200,000 households and thousands of 
community structures to support them there is always 
repair and construction work, creating strong demand 
for specific skills that would increase both employability 
and salary received. Metal work, however, would be of 
very limited use at present—the Bangladesh government 
has banned the use of metal given its permanent nature 
and the perception it would create among the host 
community.
Apprenticeship programs have the advantage of 
providing hands-on experience using skills taught in 
training, and the many international and local agencies 
working in the camps could create such opportunities 
within their existing programs. Strictly speaking, these 
would need to be unpaid apprenticeships due to the 
restriction on work; however, agencies could circumvent 
this by hiring the Rohingya as skilled cash-for-work 
(that is, paid more than unskilled labourers), which the 
government has allowed to date so long as the Rohingya 
are hired on an hourly basis. This highlights a need for 
advocacy to allow the Rohingya to be hired as staff, 
which would allow them to enjoy better work conditions 
and greater job security. This might be achieved through 
a special arrangement to allow work initially within the 
camps with a view to expanding to work outside the 
camps at a later time. Similarly, barriers to leaving the 
camp mean that trade fairs could only be conducted 
within the camp. Very interesting to note, however, is 
the shift by the Thai government to allow the sale of 
refugee-produced handicrafts in markets outside the 
camps along the Thai border. Donors and implementing 
aid agencies could use this precedent as the basis for 
advocacy to pressure the Bangladesh government to do 
the same for the Rohingya, arguing that increased access 
to specific markets, such as the nearby Kutupalong, 
Balukhali and Shamlapur markets, results in increased 
self-reliance of the Rohingya without negatively 
impacting host community livelihoods (Weftshop in 
Maynard & Suter 2009).
Samuel Hall Consulting (op cit) highlights the possible use 
of credit mechanisms, but notes: “micro-finance credit 
mechanisms require relatively stable environments to 
mitigate the risks, a condition that is not fulfilled in the 
Ethiopian camps where the fluidity of movements would 
make the mechanism unsustainable” (p. 49). While the 
extremely limited movements in and out of the camps 
at Cox’s Bazar create the ideal environment in terms 
of population stability, the Bangladesh government to 
date has banned the use of exclusive cash programming 
on a large scale, instead preferring in-kind and/or 
voucher-based programming (again due to the political 
issues involved in providing cash to refugees). Another 
issue is that the Rohingya do not officially have access 
to markets outside of the camps, and humanitarian 
agencies should not be seen to encourage refugees to 
attempt to leave the camps to procure materials and 
tools. Any micro-credit scheme would therefore need to 
operate without cash, perhaps with a points system that 
could be used to purchase goods and services within 
the camp. Samuel Hall Consulting also notes the role 
of diaspora in supporting credit mechanisms; however, 
the relatively small number of Rohingya diaspora would 
likely limit this. Notwithstanding, the Rohingya who 
have been resettled to countries such as the US, Canada, 
Australia, Ireland and the UK could both provide funds 
and lobby their respective governments to support 
these, and indeed other, schemes. 
Uganda
Uganda is host to some 1.4 million refugees, the 
vast majority of whom are from South Sudan and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR 2020). 
While Uganda has hosted refugees since as early as 
the 1950s, those currently taking refuge in Uganda 
are predominantly there as a result of the civil war in 
South Sudan that has raged since 2013. Uganda’s liberal 
refugee policy has been praised by the international 
community as a “model for Africa” (UNHCR in Schiltz et 
al 2009). Uganda follows a non-encampment policy via 
its Settlement Transformative Agenda, and legislation 
allows refugees freedom of movement and the right 
to work, to establish a business, to own property 
and access national services, including primary and 
secondary education. 92% of refugees live in settlements 
located alongside host communities in which they are 
provided with a plot of land to be used for housing and 
agricultural purposes (UNHCR, 2019). A key aspect of 
Uganda’s approach is that refugees are integrated into 
the National Development Plan, which ensures that 
refugees are formally part of the development agenda of 
Uganda (see Uganda United Nations Country Team and 
the World Bank, 2017, in their discussion of the Ugandan 
Refugee and Host Population Empowerment [ReHOPE] 
Strategic Framework). 
Despite being far more flexible than the refugee policies 
of Bangladesh, Thailand or Ethiopia, the Ugandan 
system has received strong criticism. Schiltz et al 
(2019) and Kaiser (2006) both highlight the insufficient 
resources provided to refugees living in settlements 
for them to become self-reliant, while Kaiser goes on 
to describe how the remoteness of the settlements 
results in infertile soil and poor access to markets, 
communication and transport systems. Further, while 
officially enjoying freedom of movement, refugees are 
usually still required to obtain administrative permits to 
leave and return to their designated settlements (World 
Bank 2016); in any case, they are effectively restricted 
to their settlements due to the lack of support afforded 
to them in urban areas, where they fall outside the 
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scope of Uganda’s formal refugee policies and become 
‘invisible’ (Hovil 2018). Finally, the merits of the Ugandan 
policy must be considered in light of the various 
motives at play. Hovil (ibid, p. 3) perhaps best makes 
the point: “Uganda’s progressive refugee policies have 
been shaped and adopted as part of a broader strategy 
of engagement with the international community that 
has sought to boost Uganda’s reputation and guarantee 
that its government has access to much needed external 
development and humanitarian aid.” While this should 
not necessarily detract from the policy, it does warrant 
a deeper analysis into its effectiveness and the relative 
returns enjoyed by the various stakeholders, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Criticism notwithstanding, there are clear benefits 
to the Ugandan refugee policy, which should be 
seen as an example of a possible alternative for the 
Bangladesh government. It is accepted that the 
granting of unrestricted freedom of movement and 
the right to work and own property is not possible for 
the foreseeable future due to the political implications 
(which is also unsurprising given that Uganda did not 
enact the relevant legislation until some 50 years after 
the first refugees arrived); however, settlements divided 
into plots of land and allocated to Rohingya households, 
within which they could move freely, is arguably a 
very reasonable approach under the circumstances, 
especially considering the relative similarities between 
the two contexts. The refugee caseloads in Bangladesh 
and Uganda are similar at around 1 million; a significant 
majority of land in both countries is rural; and the 
refugee and host communities in the rural areas of 
both countries share the same skills, religion and even 
language (in parts of eastern Bangladesh). In fact, the 
Rohingya were living in conditions very similar to this 
before f leeing Myanmar, the critical difference being 
that in Bangladesh they would not be subjected to 
arbitrary detention, forced labour and other human 
rights abuses by the Tatmadaw. Though some activists 
would argue that the Rohingya should enjoy full freedom 
of movement, a pragmatic approach designed to provide 
short-term solutions must involve concessions; the 
reality is that convincing the Bangladesh government to 
even allow relative freedom of movement is not an easy 
task. Given the highly politicised nature of the Rohingya 
issue in Bangladesh, rejecting the government’s 
constraints and calling for larger-scale reform will 
almost certainly be met with resistance, possibly even 
ending the conversation. While ultimately a question 
of morality, in a context where refugees are enduring 
immense physical and psychological suffering on a daily 
basis, there is a strong argument that doing so would 
be counter-productive to the core priority in this 
particular moment: the achievement of interim shorter-
term humanitarian solutions necessary to alleviate such 
hardship. 
A key challenge, however, is the political risk involved 
with the perceived integration of the refugee population 
into Bangladeshi society. As noted by Kaiser (op cit), 
without freedom of movement from the settlements, 
refugees cannot survive as they cannot access the 
markets necessary to fully capitalise on produce grown 
on their plots. The challenge then is how to provide the 
Rohingya with access to those markets without granting 
unrestricted movement rights. One potential solution 
would be to establish settlements in areas where there 
are already well-functioning markets—for example, for 
every 50 plots at least one functioning local market 
will be accessible to both host and refugee community 
members. This set-up would support the creation of the 
conditions to build self-reliance while avoiding actual or 
perceived integration by ensuring that refugees could 
not move beyond their settlement without permission. 
Worthy of note is that, at the time of writing, the 
Bangladesh government is developing land on an island 
off the coast of Bangladesh to relocate approximately 
100,000 refugees (see Banerjee 2020 for further details). 
While no movement has taken place yet, it does prove 
that the relocation of refugees to other areas of the 
country where they could move around freely is a 
realistic option. Finally, by integrating refugee support 
into the overall development program of Bangladesh, 
as was done through the Ugandan ReHOPE Strategic 
Framework, such support is likely to be seen as part of 
a larger development program that will benefit the host 
community, rather than a purely humanitarian initiative 
that will exclusively benefit the refugees. 
Key to any such strategy is advocacy for the relaxation 
of restrictions on movements. Samuel Hall Consulting 
(op cit) and Maynard & Suter (op cit) emphasise the 
importance of engaging with local authorities at various 
levels to stress the mutual benefits of allowing greater 
access to markets, whether they be for labour, goods 
or services. There is also extensive academic literature 
on the benefits of allowing the integration of refugee 
communities into host communities (World Bank 2017; 
Assad 2018; Betts et al 2014; and Fallah et al 2018). While 
the sheer number of Rohingya would present challenges, 
advocacy for at least partial access to local markets 
(possibly in the form of a set-up described above) is 
strongly recommended, based on the success of similar 
Thai and Ugandan policies. 
A tailored solution for the Rohingya in 
Bangladesh
The current discussion is focused on the role of the 
international community in pressuring Myanmar to 
create the conditions for safe repatriation, which is 
misdirected. It does not consider the repeated failed 
attempts of the West to influence Myanmar during the 
previous four decades and the fact that such attempts 
continue to have limited prospects of success today. 
While these efforts should continue through different 
means to produce better results, policy makers should 
also shift their attention to short-term humanitarian 
solutions designed to bring about improved conditions 
for the Rohingya while longer-term political solutions 
are sought. An examination of case studies in Thailand, 
Ethiopia and Uganda reveals a number of possible 
strategies. At a minimum, interventions to increase 
livelihood opportunities should be supported, including 
vocational training, apprenticeships and micro-credit 
schemes. These should be complemented by advocacy 
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to increase access to markets and trade fairs, as well 
as engagement of the Rohingya diaspora to provide 
financial and political support. Strategies such as these 
will provide the skills, knowledge and basic inputs to 
empower refugees to generate income and provide for 
themselves. 
Only so much can be done within the limits of the 
camps, however, and these initiatives should be seen 
as a bare minimum to maintain dignity and wellbeing. 
In the medium-term, the international community 
should work with the Bangladesh government to shift 
the current heavily restrictive refugee policy towards 
allowing access to land, relative freedom of movement 
and the integration of refugee support into Bangladesh’s 
overall national development strategy through a system 
such as the Ugandan Settlement Transformation Agenda. 
Formally permitting the use of land for agricultural 
or other purposes, providing support to start up 
production on that land, and ensuring access to nearby 
markets will not only provide the Rohingya with the 
means to become self-sufficient, it will stimulate the 
local economy. In doing so, this will generate significant 
benefits for the nearby host community and overall 
development of Bangladesh. These measures are critical 
to protecting the Rohingya’s basic human rights while 
longer-term political solutions are sought, which will 
one day hopefully allow the Rohingya to safely return to 
their homes in Myanmar. 
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